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Abstract
Since 1963 the ‘Cyprus question’ has proved one of the most intractable inter-
communal conflicts within the international system. Despite the assiduous involvement
of the United Nations, the long list of negotiations and inter-communal talks have failed
to yield any concrete agreement. What are the roots and causes of the ‘Cyprus question’
and what explains the international community’s repeated failures to resolve it? This
paper argues that the causes of the ‘Cyprus question’ comprise two crucial dimensions.
First, the conflict is caused by the underlying inter-communal dispute between Greek
and Turkish Cypriots, which is in turn triggered both by real and by imaginary
conditions of division and disparity. Second, the ‘Cyprus question’ is the product of a
delicate balance of elite interests. Clearly, a solution to the problem must reflect both
dimensions. An initial settlement that represents preferable payoffs than the current
status quo to both community elites, must be brokered. Thereafter it is possible to tackle
the real conditions of division and disparity, which cause the underlying inter-
communal conflict. The overarching framework of prosperity and stability provided by
the European Union could contribute in both respects by facilitating the formulation and
implementation of an initial inter-elite settlement and accelerating the ultimate
eradication of the underlying conflict between peoples.
*Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. Many thanks to
M. Emerson, D.Gros, C.Heinze, H.Kabaalioglu, A. Larson, D. Lindley, N.Neuwahl, M.Rupp,
A.Theophanous and G.Vandersanden, for their useful comments on earlier drafts.1
The ‘Cyprus Question’:
Reshaping Community Identities and Elite Interests
within a Wider European Framework
Nathalie Tocci
I. Introduction
Studies of the ‘Cyprus question’ often focus on the recent history of the island
particularly since the last years of British colonial rule. As a result policy conclusions
have tended to be based upon specific interpretations of history. Views favouring the
Turkish Cypriot interpretation of events have called for two separate states joined at
most through a loose confederation, in the light of the injustices committed by the
Greek Cypriots in the period between 1963 and 1974. Arguments favouring Greek
Cypriot versions of the past have favoured a unified federal state, given that anything
but single and indivisible sovereignty would imply an implicit acceptance of what was
in their view and illegal and immoral military intervention by the Turkish forces in
1974.
A past version of this paper did indeed include a short section on the recent history of
the conflict, and the author’s interpretation of events. However, the analysis of the
problem, was based upon the current situation in Cyprus. Its policy conclusions, while
at times drawing from the lessons of history, aimed to be forward looking rather than an
attempt to rectify past injustices. Given, among other factors, the near impossibility of
briefly reviewing the historical evolution of the conflict in a non-contentious manner
and the diversion of attention from forward looking analysis this implies, the current
version abstains from an historical introduction to the ‘Cyprus question’ and begins
with an analysis of the causes of the problem today.
II. Causes of the ‘Cyprus question’: community and elite conflicts
Examining the roots and causes of the ‘Cyprus question’ and the reasons behind failed
attempts at settlement negotiation is fundamental to any study of conflict resolution on
the island. The approach adopted in this paper is that modern intra and inter stateNathalie Tocci
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conflicts are neither inevitable nor irrational incidents, but rather stem from both from
tangible conditions and realities on the ground and the rational calculation of interests of
the actors involved
1. This is not to say that hatred and fear play no role in the creation
and continuation of conflict. However, what appear to be irrational ethnic hatreds and
fears are often driven by a set of concrete conditions, which render such sentiments not
as irrational as they may first appear. On top of such conditions and the subsequent
formation of popular attitudes and sentiments, elites articulate their interests adding a
second crucial dimension to each conflict. Following this logic, it is clear that conflicts
cannot be settled in a durable and non-coercive manner unless both the underlying
conditions giving rise to particular popular attitudes are eradicated and elite interests in
the conflict are accounted for. Only once these two dimensions are understood and
incorporated in an agreement, can peace be attained. Long-lasting settlement can be
achieved only following the construction of a viable political economy of peace based
upon an understanding of that of conflict.
1. The causes of the ‘Cyprus question’ today
Historical factors ranging from the Ottoman millet system of governance to British
‘divide and rule’ strategies, the traditional Greek Cypriot aim of enosis (union between
Greece and Cyprus), Turkey’s strategic interest in the island and the role of external
powers in the Cold War context, go far in explaining the initiation of ethnic conflict in
Cyprus. But these do not explain its continuation to the present day. Additional and
arguably more powerful factors have emerged since the 1960s and early 1970s hugely
exacerbating the inter-communal dispute between a new generation of Cypriots. Real
conditions of division and the total absence of multiethnic society complemented by
irrational fear and prejudice, together with further complicating factors such as
extensive militarisation and immigration flows, explain the persisting inter-communal
conflict on the island. The inability of negotiators to address these real and imaginary
divisions partly explains their failure to resolve the ‘Cyprus question’.
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a) Inter-communal divisions, the absence of a Cypriot identity and the failure of
negotiations
Persisting inter-communal conflict in Cyprus is driven by real conditions of division
and disparity, which, exacerbated by the accompanying deep-rooted fears and
misperceptions of the ‘other’, have rendered the emergence of either a shared Cypriot
identity or two peacefully coexisting and complementary identities increasingly distant
prospects. Let us single out the precise conditions of division spurring the inter-
communal conflict.
 i. Separate governance
The first condition of division creating two antagonising nations is the existence of a
clear division in governance. Since 1967 Cyprus has witnessed two systems of
governance: the formally recognised Republic of Cyprus governing the Greek Cypriot
people and the de facto Turkish Cypriot government, governing the Turkish Cypriot
community. In the light of persisting conflict, the latter was transformed from being an
administration serving the Turkish Cypriots in 1967-1974, to being a de facto state since
1983 when Denktas declared the formation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC). The emergence of two distinct states with separate and non-communicating
governments, administrations, judiciaries, police and military forces has greatly
exacerbated division between peoples, wiping away all experience of joint governance
and shared political culture.
 ii. Lack of social, cultural or economic relations
The second condition of division has been the virtual absence of any social, cultural or
economic links between the two communities. The existing and already limited links
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots began to be severed in 1963, when over 30,000
Turkish Cypriots were relegated to enclaves. The government, regarding the enclaves as
a state within the state
2, imposed an economic embargo of strategic goods and services
upon the enclaves and restricted the latter’s free movement. Thereafter, following the
1974 Turkish military intervention and the resulting territorial separation of the two
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communities on opposite sides of the impenetrable ‘green line’ which runs from
Famagusta (Magusa) in the east to Morphou Bay in the north west
3, contact between the
two parties virtually disappeared. In the social and cultural spheres, linkages between
the two peoples are inhibited by the territorial separation preventing relations between
groups or individuals from opposing sides of the boundary. In the economic sphere, the
economic embargo of the Republic of Cyprus on its northern counterpart has rendered
economic linkages through trade and joint initiatives almost non-existent. Economic
relations are limited to the delivery of electricity from the south to the north, water
distribution from the north to the south and marginal employment of Turkish Cypriots
in the Republic of Cyprus. Any other linkage is either banned or under strict control.
Hence, new generations of Cypriots are growing without any form of contact with the
opposing community. Most young Cypriots today have never met anyone from the other
ethnic group living on the opposite side of the border. This in turn has encouraged
radical political opinions based on biased evidence and prejudice and therefore
hampered prospects of peace based at most upon the reintegration of the two peoples of
Cyprus or at least on their peaceful coexistence.
 iii. Inter-communal economic disparities and the integration of the TRNC with Turkey
The third condition fostering contrasting identities and purposes is the wide disparity in
standards of economic development between the two communities. Even prior to the
overt emergence of the inter-communal conflict, economic levels of the two
communities differed substantially. Under Ottoman rule, while the politically
advantaged Muslim population permeated government, the Greek Orthodox community
became deeply entrenched in the Cypriot economy and gained substantial economic
power. These existing disparities greatly increased in the decades following the
emergence of the conflict. The 1974 military intervention and the subsequent partition
of the island left both ethnic communities in a state of total economic disarray.
Industries relying on inter-communal backward and forward linkages became unviable,
tourism declined dramatically and unemployment spiralled upwards as a result of the
large ethnic migratory flows within the island. However, while the Greek Cypriot
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economy in the southern regions of the island experienced a successful recovery and
subsequent economic prosperity, the Turkish Cypriot economy in the north remained
stagnant and undeveloped. Hence, the exacerbation of economic disparities between the
two communities which have fostered difference and conflict.
The Greek Cypriot economic success has been facilitated by the status of the Republic
of Cyprus as the only internationally recognised state on the island. As a small economy
it has hugely benefited from trade and investment flows and it has been able to
reconstruct its economy based on international markets and division of labour. This has
enabled it to develop its two major comparative advantages, the light manufacturing
industry aimed at the European public and tourism. The Republic of Cyprus has also
successfully developed an offshore financial service sector. These three branches of
economic activity contributed to an average growth rate of approximately 7% and an
unemployment rate of 3% in the 1990s. The Republic of Cyprus also manifests well-
managed public accounts and stable money markets. Average public deficits in southern
Cyprus amounted to 1.3% in 1987-1997 and in 1997 the public debt was approximately
54% GDP, discount rates were 7% and inflation was 2.6%
4. In addition the Cypriot
pound has been stable since it was anchored to the DM with a +/-1.25% fluctuation
bound in 1992 and thereafter to the euro in 1999 with a fluctuation bound of +/-2.25%.
On the other hand, the northern regions present a starkly opposed scenario. Although
the 37% of the island’s territory under Turkish Cypriot control is fully equipped with
the necessary infrastructure for tourism and includes a high proportion of the potential
for total cultivated land, the northern economy lags a long way behind the southern one.
The productivity of TRNC amounts to only 38% of the productivity of the Republic of
Cyprus
5. Agriculture remains undeveloped and largely subsistence based. Fertiliser and
tractor use are limited and desertification widespread. Despite adequate infrastructure
and noteworthy environmental, cultural and architectural attractions in northern Cyprus,
tourism is under-exploited and largely consists of visitors from Turkey
6. The economy
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is dominated by an unproductive public sector which leads to serious fiscal imbalances
that are only partially rectified by Turkish transfers. Extensive state capitalism has also
implied considerable corruption and clientelism further hampering the efficiency and
productivity of the north.
This stagnant and unproductive economy has been to a large extent a result of the
TRNC’s international non-recognition and the economic embargoes imposed by the
Republic of Cyprus and Greece and recently led by the EU
7. The international
community, excluding Turkey, has repeatedly rejected the self-proclaimed state of
northern Cyprus
8. This has induced both the under-exploitation of the economic
potential of this small economy and the close ties between northern Cyprus and Turkey.
Trade in agricultural and manufactured goods is limited due to serious international
trade restrictions. Investment is deterred by the uncertain legal status of the ‘state’, the
high production costs of the small economy, inflation and the inconvertibility of the
Turkish lira. Especially since the crash of the international trading company Polly Peck,
foreign investment in Turkish Cypriot agriculture, manufacturing and services has been
virtually non-existent. Tourism is minimal given the fear of travelling to an
internationally deemed ‘illegal’ state and the absence of international air-links from
destinations other than Turkey. Finally, international non-recognition has implied that
northern Cyprus receives limited international state aid apart from Turkish aid. Most
foreign aid is directed to NGOs operating in northern Cyprus.
As a small economy reliant on trade, international ostracisation has led to the growing
economic affiliation of the TRNC to Turkey. Economic ties with Turkey have taken the
form of regional economic co-operation, Turkish credit facilities to northern Cyprus and
numerous joint transport networks and industrial development projects. In 1998 Turkey
formed an Association Council with the TRNC foreseeing a close union in trade outlets,
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political solidarity and budgetary support. However, economic links to Turkey have not
only been insufficient to compensate the costs of international isolation, but have also
implied the inheritance of Turkish macroeconomic imbalances. The TRNC has
recognised the Turkish lira as its legal tender and has therefore imported Turkish
inflation and monetary instability. Standing in sharp contrast to figures in the southern
economy, in the TRNC inflation fluctuates around 60% and real bank lending rates and
market interest rates are approximately 30%. The absence of a large capital market and
the lack of control over monetary policy have also implied that the TRNC’s public
deficits depend upon transfers from the Turkish Republic for rectification
9. Imported
fiscal and monetary instability has further hindered trade, investment and therefore
overall growth.
Table 1: Comparison between the Greek & Turkish Cypriot communities: 1976-95
Republic of Cyprus TRNC*
Annual average GNP growth 6.8% 3.8%
GDP per capita 1997 $12,850 $4,158
Employment in primary sector 1997 12% 23%
Employment in public sector 1997 3% 18%
Tourists per year 1994 2,069,000 361,692
Public deficit %GDP 1997 1.3% 14%
Annual inflation 1995-1999 2.1% 60%
Discount rates 1999 7% 31%
Unemployment 1996 3.1% 25%
* Real figures for northern Cyprus are higher in the light of the level of unrecorded economic activity.
Source: Planning Bureau, Republic of Cyprus (1996).
These wide and all-encompassing economic disparities add to the conditions of inter-
communal division, which in turn breed conflict. Economic disparities imply radically
different ways of life and standards of living, which impose tight constraints to inter-
communal contact and relations. As E. Olgun put it: ‘so long as such disparities exist it
will not be possible to build up the necessary trust, confidence, mutual respect and
recognition which are essential ingredients of a win-win solution’
10.
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International ostracisation and the resulting integration of the TRNC with Turkey has
also deepened the conflict. The TRNC can only trade through Turkey, it shares the same
currency and it receives Turkish budgetary and political support. In addition post and
telecommunications can only reach the TRNC through Turkey and in order to travel
outside Turkey, Turkish Cypriots require a Turkish passport. Greece and the Republic
of Cyprus as well as all other international spectators are thus inclined to view northern
Cyprus as an effective Turkish province. This cannot but reinforce the conflict by
consolidating the inter-communal antagonism.
 iv. The underlying Greek-Turkish rivalry
The final cause of division between the two ethnic communities on the island is the
underlying conflict between their respective motherland countries: Greece and Turkey.
Since the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and the subsequent four
centuries of Ottoman rule over Greece, which terminated with the Greek wars of
independence against Ottoman rule in 1821-29, tensions between the two nations have
been high. Rivalries were reinforced in the late 19
th and 20
th centuries with the wars of
1897, 1912-13 and 1919-23 and since 1974 by conflicts over oil drilling rights in the
Aegean off the Greek island and Thassos close to the Turkish border. As long as these
rivalries persist and the two ethnic communities in Cyprus identify with Greece and
Turkey respectively, the creation of constructive and complementary identities will
remain unfulfilled.
 v. Inter-communal misperceptions and fears and the ‘securitisation’ of the conflict
The real conditions of division and difference analysed above have fuelled a set of
illusory fears and misperceptions, and the widespread ‘securitisation’
11 of all aspects of
the ‘Cyprus question’, which have aggravated the initial conflict and reduced the
likelihood of its resolution.
Conditions of division and disparity have reinforced perceptions of separate identities
and have cemented deep-rooted distrust and fear of the ‘other’ amongst both
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communities. Real conditions have transformed the mindset of both peoples, in a
manner precluding a long-lasting solution based either upon a shared Cypriot identity or
upon the peaceful and complementary coexistence of two communities. Media and
books have selected primordial elements of division and antagonism such as ethnicity,
language and religion to define and legitimise respective ‘imagined communities’
12
while neglecting other aspects such as the shared colonial history, customs and
traditions. The peoples of Cyprus have chosen to forget those common aspects of
everyday life which they continue to share despite separation and disparity thus adding
on top of real causes of division, imaginary differences fuelled by irrational fear and
prejudice.
People’s attitudes towards the ‘other’ community were illustrated by a recent poll
carried out in in March 2000 in the Republic of Cyprus
13. The poll revealed that Greek
Cypriots are only willing to live with Turkish Cypriots at a distance. 75% of the
interviewed Greek Cypriots stated they would not accept a member of their family
marrying a Turkish Cypriot, over 80% stated that in the event of a federal solution they
would not live in the Turkish Cypriot unit and between 30 to 40% of the interviewees
were against working in the same place as a Turkish Cypriot, living in a mixed village
or allowing their children to attend the same schools as Turkish Cypriot children. These
figures highlight how real conditions have transformed the mindset of the peoples, in a
manner precluding a long-lasting solution based either upon a shared Cypriot identity or
upon the peaceful and complementary coexistence of two communities within the same
political entity.
Conditions of division have also triggered the ‘securitisation’ of the conflict, i.e. the
depiction of the ‘other’ and the issues at stake in the conflict as an essential threat to
one’s own identity and existence. Separation and lack of contact, economic disparities
and the integration of the TRNC with Turkey to a large extent driven by the former’s
international non-recognition, and the overarching aura of Greek-Turkish tensions have
encouraged the extensive ‘securitisation’ and ‘counter-securitisation’ of the question.
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Consequently, the conflict has been transferred in the realm of security, legitimising
words and actions lying beyond the sphere of ‘normal political debate’
14 and thus
reducing the scope for conflict resolution.
 vi. Militarisation of the island and the settler problem
The process of ‘demonisation of the other’ gained a momentum of its own in the light of
extensive militarisation of the island and the substantial influx of Anatolian settlers in
the north. First, militarisation in Cyprus has exacerbated mutual fears and suspicion
between the two communities, particularly on the Greek Cypriot side given the
disproportionate presence of Turkish troops on the island. In an island with less than
800,000 inhabitants there are 30,000 Turkish troops and 4,500 Turkish Cypriot troops in
northern Cyprus. Militarisation in the TRNC considerably outweighs that in the
Republic of Cyprus. Tsardanidis and Nicolau
15 claim that ratios of military manpower
are 3.5:1 for example. On the one hand, Turkish Cypriots favour the extensive presence
of Turkish troops, which they regard as a guarantee for their continued separation from
their Greek Cypriot counter-parts and thus in their eyes for their physical survival. On
the other hand, the knowledge of such extensive militarisation in the north exacerbates
the fears of Greek Cypriots and confirms in their eyes the view that the ‘Cyprus
question’ is determined by the Turkish occupation of the island due to the strategic
significance of the latter to Turkey
16. In turn since 1997 Greek Cypriots have been
undergoing significant military upgrading through the ‘Joint Defence Doctrine’ placing
the Republic of Cyprus under the Greek military umbrella and increasing annual
defence expenditure to $300m, i.e., 7% of Greek Cypriot GNP. Glafcos Clerides
decided in 1998 to run his presidential election campaign on a pledge to ignore
warnings from the international community and deploy Russian S-300 missiles
17.
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Second, the influx of poor and landless Anatolian settlers has also added additional
momentum to the Cyprus conflict. In the past three decades between 30,000 and 80,000
immigrants from Southeast Anatolia and the Black Sea coastal area have settled in
northern Cyprus. The settlers have been encouraged by northern Cyprus authorities first
because of the acute labour shortages in northern economy and second and most
important as a perceived form of security and legitimisation for their disproportionate
territorial occupation. Faced with an overwhelming Greek Cypriot demographic
majority and its disproportionately low ratio of land to ethnic inhabitants, northern
Cypriot governments have encouraged a massive influx of Turkish settlers on the island.
Hence, the increase of Turkish population from 18.5% to 24% of the overall population
of the island
18. The influx of settlers and their deep affiliations to motherland Turkey
have in turn exacerbated fears and prejudices amongst the Greek Cypriot population,
who fear that such a deliberate demographic alteration is intended to encourage the
domination of Turkish Cypriots over their Greek compatriots.
Hence, real and imaginary divisions and respective ‘securitisations’ ensure the
persistence of the Cyprus conflict and explain its intractability. The inability of the
international community and the negotiating parties to adequately address these
conditions represents a major cause of the failure of settlement talks. A settlement of the
‘Cyprus question’ has not been attained because conditions of separation and difference
persist and so communities continue to define themselves in mutually exclusive terms
resisting the creation of a shared identity or the prospect of peaceful coexistence. The
international community has to a large extent neglected and according to some partly
caused these conditions cementing and exacerbating the conflict. Internationally
mediated negotiations have concentrated on formulating feasible structures of a federal
settlement while often neglecting the existing conditions of separation and disparity
which represent the ultimate barrier to a true settlement of the problem beyond its
ostensible resolution. It was not until 1993 that the UN proposed a set of CBMs
intended to reverse some of the very conditions mentioned above but the measures have
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not yet been implemented. Moreover, the international community has fuelled the
dynamics of the conflict by widening the economic disparities between northern and
southern regions. Economic isolation has exacerbated the divisions between the
economically prosperous south and stagnant and unstable north and has induced the
progressive integration of the latter into Turkey. Until conditions are rectified to
‘desecuritise’ the conflict and induce the two communities to live, trust and cooperate
with each other, a long-lasting resolution of the ‘Cyprus question’ will remain a utopian
prospect.
b) Elite interests in the ‘Cyprus question’ and the failure of negotiations
So far we have analysed the causes of the continuation of the conflict between the two
ethnic communities in Cyprus. The balance of elite interests in the ‘Cyprus question’
presents another important dimension of the conflict explaining why the problem
persists and why settlement negotiations have failed to resolve it. In other words the
‘Cyprus question’ cannot be only interpreted as a conflict between two peoples
triggered by a set of unfavourable conditions, but must also be seen as the result of
balance of elite interests. This in turn affects the framework of analysis in which one
can begin to speculate on proposed solutions. Existing inter-elite bargaining positions
create a set of constraints which seriously limit the viable options open for bargaining.
Negotiations are carried out in a second best world in which feasible solutions must
offer both negotiating parties preferred payoffs than the standing status quo. Under any
other proposal incentives to resolve the conflict are absent. Regardless of what the
‘ideal’ or ‘first best’ solution to the conflict may be, the means to attain it must
pragmatically account for the current state of elite positions. Understanding these
positions is therefore crucial to a thorough appreciation of the dynamics of the ‘Cyprus
question’ upon which a lasting settlement can be built.
So let us probe deeper into the dynamics of elite interests. In order to understand elite
positions in the negotiating process it is necessary to understand first what are the
ultimate aims and second what are the current payoffs. These two factors together
determine elite bargaining positions, crucial to the determination of a political
settlement.The ‘Cyprus Question’
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Beginning with the Turkish Cypriot side, Turkish Cypriot elites aim at a political
settlement in which the two communities effectively run their own affairs as two
separate sovereign states within either a loose confederation or two separate states. They
fiercely resist a settlement based on single sovereignty and territoriality in which, due to
demographic realities, they fear that Turkish Cypriots would be at best be granted full
individual rights and community minority rights. Due to their reliance on Turkey, the
Turkish Cypriot elite also calls for a retention of Turkey’s guarantor status. Turning
instead to the current status quo, it is imperative to account for the reality that, despite
international ostracisation, the Turkish Cypriots have been governed by a de facto state
since 1974. The Turkish Cypriot state is fully equipped with a government, a central
bank, a judiciary and an administration, it is effectively secured by a large mainly
Turkish military force and it is recognised as the legitimate government in 37% of the
island’s territory. It follows that Turkish Cypriot negotiating elites will not settle for a
compromise in which their de facto achievements will be substantially removed without
adequate compensation in terms of first and foremost international political recognition
and then economic gains. Hence, Denktas’ persistent refusal of majority rule within a
federal arrangement
19 and his rejection in 1998 of a federal arrangement in favour of a
confederation in which the principle of unanimity would prevail.
Turning to the Greek Cypriots, the Republic of Cyprus’s negotiating elite aims at a
settlement based on the single sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent
Cyprus. They accept a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation but nonetheless call for a
relatively strong central government, in which, due to demographic realities, they would
represent a strong majority. The political equality of the two communities would be
represented at the level of the federated states and not explicitly at the federal level
20. In
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terms of current achievements it is important to realise that the Republic of Cyprus is
both a de facto and a de jure state, the only state in Cyprus recognised by the
international community. It thus enjoys a superior political status compared to its
northern counterpart. To a large extent as a product of its international status, the
Republic of Cyprus is also a prosperous state whose per capita GNP is three to four
times that of the TRNC. This explains Clerides’ insistence on a tight federal
arrangement, refugee return, the withdrawal of Turkish troops and a redefinition of
territorial boundaries.
However, the ‘Cyprus question’ is not simply determined by the inter-communal
conflict and Cypriot elite bargaining positions. A much wider international dimension
comprising Greece, Turkey, the EU and the wider international community also shapes
the conflict in two distinct ways. First, external actors have their own positions on the
conflict, which influence and pressurise elites on the island. Second, their actions and
decisions affect the bargaining field of negotiating elites. Although inter-communal elite
interests form the first and most important stratum of the conflict, the effects of wider
elite positions on the overall shape of the inter-elite balance of interests are also of
crucial significance.
Let us therefore analyse the interests and influencing roles of Greece, Turkey, the
European Union and the United Nations in the ‘Cyprus question’. Beginning with
Greece, the political elite in Athens strongly backs the Greek Cypriot cause and
condemns the illegality of the TRNC imposing an economic blockade on it together
with the EU. Greece calls for a political settlement in which the Republic of Cyprus is
recognised as the only sovereign state within a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation.
Furthermore, it firmly supports the Greek Cypriot incorporation in the European Union
and the resulting liberalisation of the ‘three freedoms’. Hence, its pressure within the
EU exerted through the threat of veto on the EU-Turkey customs union in 1995 to
ensure the initiation of accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek concern
with the ‘Cyprus question’ was again manifested at the 1999 European Council in
Helsinki.The ‘Cyprus Question’
15
This leads us to the EU position regarding the ‘Cyprus question’. In the past the Union
has been relatively uninvolved with the Cyprus conflict merely supporting UN
initiatives and resolutions. However following the Republic of Cyprus’ application for
EU membership, its involvement has had to necessarily intensify, becoming an internal
party to the conflict. Positions within the Union are notoriously divided on the issue.
France, Germany, Italy and Holland have repeatedly called for a political settlement
prior to Cyprus’ EU accession. Germany has also recently adopted a more pro-Turkish
stance manifested by the recent invitation of Denktas by the German Foreign Minister.
However, Greece has stood firm on its position, threatening to veto the entire eastern
enlargement if Cyprus is not admitted to the Union on the grounds of the persisting
‘Cyprus question’. Such a firm stance has proved to act as the determinant of the overall
EU position on the issue, prevailing over other member states’, most notably France’s
position. Hence, the Union, while advocating a settlement based on UN
recommendations prior to membership, is ready to admit a divided Cyprus to the
European family. The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 formally removed
any precondition of political settlement to Cyprus’ EU membership.
On the other hand, Turkey under the present leadership of Bülent Ecevit, i.e., the leader
responsible for the 1974 Turkish military intervention, is overwhelmingly supportive of
Denktas’ call for the TRNC’s international recognition. Turkey regards its 1974
intervention as a responsibility under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and holds that a
phased withdrawal of Turkish troops will only be possible following political
settlement. It also repeatedly declares its strategic interest in the island, maintaining the
‘Cyprus question’ near the top of its foreign policy priorities. In the past, external
developments facilitated Turkey’s hard stance regarding the ‘Cyprus question’. The
perception in Turkey of an EU rejection following the 1997 Luxembourg summit gave
the country greater freedom to support the Turkish Cypriot cause. Until Ankara’s way
to EU membership was blocked, its incentives to compromise on Cyprus were non-
existent. However, such a degree of freedom has diminished substantially following the
December 1999 European Council decision for two inter-related reasons. First,
Turkey’s prospect of EU membership has risen following the decision to grant Turkey
its long desired candidate status on 10 December 1999. Although Turkey will not beginNathalie Tocci
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accession negotiations until it complies with the Copenhagen political criteria and
resolves its territorial disputes with Greece, its EU membership is now a more realistic
prospect. Hence, the importance of the Cyprus obstacle to Turkey’s EU membership.
The resolution of the conflict is a formal condition for Turkey’s EU membership.
Second, as mentioned above, the 1999 European Council explicitly removed the
precondition of political settlement to Cyprus’ accession to the Union. This implies that
Cyprus is likely to become an EU member before Turkey and therefore that unless a
political settlement is found, Turkey will find itself in the uncomfortable position of
being an EU candidate invading EU territory. If the current optimism in Turkey EU
relations persists, these two developments could soften Turkey’s position on the
‘Cyprus question’. However, Turkey’s road to the European Union is long and ridden
with serious obstacles and the current optimism is already beginning to falter
21.
Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Cyprus is thus more likely to remain unaltered.
Finally, turning to the UN’s role in the ‘Cyprus question’, the UN, being itself a
reflection of the international system of clear-cut states, has traditionally supported the
Greek Cypriots’ call for a single independent state with one indivisible sovereignty and
territorial integrity. All UN resolutions so far have called for a political settlement along
these lines and rejected the self-proclaimed TRNC.
But let us draw these diverse external factors together and analyse their cumulative
impact on the negotiating process in Cyprus. On the one hand, the removal of any
precondition on Cyprus EU membership effectively means that if a settlement cannot be
found, a divided Cyprus is likely to enter the Union with the Republic of Cyprus as its
only recognised government. Hence, the reduced incentives of the Greek Cypriots to
compromise on their positions. On the other hand, the Helsinki decision implies that
Denktas has no veto over the island’s EU membership. This in turn greatly increases his
need to broker a settlement in the next four to five years. Additional pressure on the
Turkish Cypriots may also come from Ankara. While continuing to back the Turkish
Cypriot cause, Turkey may begin to pressurise the Turkish Cypriots to find a political
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settlement. It is thus not surprising that only one week after the Helsinki conclusions,
Denktas proposed a settlement within the EU provided the Union would recognise the
TRNC as a separate entity on the island
22. Nonetheles, Turkey’s support for the TRNC’s
claim to socvereignty is likely to persist and therefore Turkish Cypriot bottom line
demands would probably remain unaltered.
The brief exposition of opposing elite interests in Cyprus highlights the reality that not
only are the options open for compromise severely restricted but also that both sides are
relatively content with the status quo and thus their incentives to compromise are low.
Paradoxically elite incentives to compromise have been at times further reduced by the
involvement of international community. The UN has become a channel through which
the Greek Cypriots, fully represented in the General Assembly, succeeded in
internationalising the ‘Cyprus question’ through political debate, diplomacy and
publicisation. Furthermore, the provision of UN peace keeping forces has reduced the
costs of conflict in Cyprus thereby reducing the need to seriously negotiate an
agreement
23. Relations with the EU have further reduced incentives to compromise by
allowing the possibility of an accession of a divided Cyprus to the Union.
Another issue to be considered when analysing elite interests is the dynamic nature of
the conflict. After almost thirty-seven years of conflict, the questions to be tackled
remain unaltered. However, given that de facto conditions and consequently elite
interests have significantly changed, viable answers have been considerably
transformed. It is therefore not surprising that official elite demands have changed
accordingly. For example, inter-communal negotiations between 1964 and 1974 were
based upon the joint objective of a unitary state and yielded agreements on the merging
of the constitutional and high court and the abolition of presidential vetoes and separate
legislative majorities. Agreement however was not found because the Greek Cypriots
refused the concept of Turkish Cypriot autonomy in local government, claiming this
would signify a concealed federation
24. Following the de facto partition of the island in
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1974, the common aim stated in the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements
25 was that of
a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, whose precise format was to be subsequently
debated. In the absence of any agreement, Denktas explicitly refuted in 1998 even the
idea of a federal arrangement in favour of a confederation in which the two states would
retain their sovereignty. These changes appear rational once changing elite interests in
response to changing conditions are accounted for. Although prior to territorial partition
an agreement based on a unitary state had been feasible, following de facto bi-zonality
and separate governance, a federal solution became the new common ground. Similarly,
while after three years of partition Denktas regarded a bi-communal federation an
appealing solution, after over thirty years of a de facto Turkish Cypriot state, a preferred
payoff would require the de facto and de jure recognition of the TRNC. This reality
highlights the gravity of inaction. The more settlement is delayed and proposals ignore
the realities of changing elite interests and the more the conflict acquires additional
momentum and positive sum options become increasingly scarce.
III. Moving towards a resolution of the ‘Cyprus question’
Having analysed the today’s causes of the Cyprus conflict, let us offer some suggestions
regarding a possible peace plan. The above analysis suggests that moving towards peace
in Cyprus requires a three step process incorporating the two dimensions of the Cyprus
conflict, i.e. the inter-communal and the intyer-elite conflict. A first and immediate step
could foresee a series of independent measures aimed at increasing confidence between
the two communities. A sustainable resolution of the conflict requires an elimination of
the inter-communal conflict and the creation of elements of a shared Cypriot identity to
complement the separate identities and community affiliations with Greece or Turkey.
Hence, the need to eradicate the underlying conditions fostering the ‘securitisation’ of
the conflict. Measures to eradicate the inter-communal conflict do not require an
agreement between the two parties and could thus be independently implemented by
one or both communities prior to a solution.
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Second and most important the two negotiating elites must agree to an initial settlement
proposal. To achieve such an agreement it is crucial to account for the interests of the
negotiating parties. Conflict resolution will carried out in a second best world, where the
optimal solution may not necessarily be a viable one. A solution is only feasible if it can
be interpreted as a positive sum game in which both elites can benefit.
Finally, one would foresee the dynamic evolution of the constitutional agreement. The
Cyprus conflict cannot be truly resolved with an initial agreement between state elites.
Once confidence building measures are implemented and the inter-communal conflict
gradually erodes, the initial inter-elite agreement may evolve to account for the
changing realities on the island. Conflict resolution will thus involve a dynamic process,
where the constitutional system and the the erosion of the inter-communal conflict will
evolve together.
1. Independent confidence building measures prior to an agreement
An agreement between the two authorities on the island is not expected in the very near
future. Nonetheless, some action could be undertaken immediately to gradually bridge
divisions and misperceptions between communities and thus erode the inter-communal
conflict. Such action does not require an agreement between the two negotiating parties,
but could be undertaken independently if the two sides allowed civil society groups and
NGOs on the island to operate freely and the Republic of Cyprus in particular opened its
labour market. Were these two developments to take place, they could facilitate the
erosion of the inter-communal conflict and thereafter encourage an inter-elite
agreement.
a) Increasing social and cultural inter-communal relations
Social and cultural contact should be encouraged by both sides independently in order
to bridge divisions between communities and reduce misperceptions and fears. The
importance of social and cultural ties between the communities has been recognised and
some progress in deepening and widening such links has been made. For example there
are three bi-communal educational groups which organise bi-communal choir and
drama activities, public lectures, exhibitions and student exchanges. Such activitiesNathalie Tocci
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should certainly be encouraged and supported by both authorities on the island.
Furthermore, inter-communal discussion groups could be established as an integral
element of conflict resolution. Inter-communal groups could meet regularly to discuss
elements of similarity between the two communities in terms of history, culture,
traditions and way of life, gradually building upon those elements of a joint Cypriot
identity which could form essential and constructive elements of the separate communal
identities and thus contribute to the ‘desecuritisation’ of the conflict.
b) Increasing economic relations and re-balancing economic disparities
Second, economic relations should be encouraged by immediately lifting the Greek
Cypriot embargo on the north and allowing the employment of Turkish Cypriots in the
Republic of Cyprus. Inter-communal economic cooperation over water and sewage
projects for example would not only foster peace by representing another route of inter-
communal contact, but it would also increase economic efficiency. Moreover, the
employment of Turkish Cypriots workers in the more prosperous Republic of Cyprus
would also contribute to a rebalancing of regional inequalities.
2. An initial agreement between state elites
While initial confidence building measures would be desirable in so far as they would
prepare the ground for the future settlement of the Cyprus question, the resolution of the
conflict ultimately hinges upon an initial agreement between the two conflicting
authorities. Without the constraints inbuilt in the Cyprus conflict one could feasibly
propose an agreement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots along UN lines based on a
unitary and bi-communal and bi-zonal state. However, despite the merits of such a
solution, a unitary bi-communal state along the lines of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus
and the UN resolutions since 1974 would be both unviable if one accounts for the
matrix of elite positions, and above all unsustainable once one foresees the likely
consequences of its immediate implementation on the island. A state without the
backing of a nation fails in the context of an underlying ‘securitised’ ethnic conflict. In
Cyprus a solution based on a unitary sovereign state failed in 1963 and would be even
more likely to do so today. It is therefore crucial to propose a settlement which is bothThe ‘Cyprus Question’
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viable in terms of an initial agreement and sustainable in terms of its subsequent
implementation.
a) An initial constitutional settlement
Let us focus first on the viability of an initial settlement. Given an initial agreement
must account for the constraints imposed by the current status quo of elite positions, a
second best solution must entail an improvement from the situation for both negotiating
parties.
Currently the leaderships on the island appear to stand for opposed and seemingly
unmoveable positions. The Greek Cypriots call for a federation comprising two
politically equal federal units and a more or less strong sovereign federal authority. The
Turkish Cypriots on the other hand stand for a confederation between two sovereign
states in Cyprus who may jointly determine their policies in certain areas of government
on the basis of unanimity. (see Box 1 for the definition of federations and
confederations).
Box 1: Static definitions of federation and confederation in international public law
26
International public law sets out a number models for the organisation of state structures which are
conventionally used in the discussion of the constitutional resolution of ethnic conflicts. The key legal
concept underlying these models is that of sovereignty, which according to standard theory is assumed
to be one and indivisible. All models thus fall into one of two categories: there is either one or more
than one state. Each state has indivisible external sovereignty and inviolable borders. All other matters
including internal sovereignty, are considered to be an internal state affair.
Within the class of a single state, one possible form of constitutional design is the federation. A
federation exists when within one unified state with single international status, the division of
competences between the central and the regional levels is constitutionally entrenched and thus may
not be unilaterally revoked by the former. Within a federal constitution: ‘Central and regional
authorities are each endowed with exclusive fields of legislative and executive competence’
27 allowing
each to be co-ordinate but independent in their spheres of governance. A federation may be one in
which the central government remains co-equal to member state governments, or one in which it is
superior to them.
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However, while internal sovereignty may be divided, externally the federation remains one
internationally recognised state, with a single nationality and territory
28
. As far as the international
community is concerned a federation ranks equal to a unitary state and the decision to federalise a
unitary state does not change the latter’s international personality. Naturally, the federation may wish
to entrust some policy competences in the field external relations to the federated states: “Constitutive
units of a federal state are not sovereign notwithstanding the fact that they may.….engage in limited
international relations”.’
29
 The international role of federated states does not however amount to its
external sovereignty. The federation remains a sovereign state consisting of non-sovereign states
30.
The classic form a state structure where each state retains its sovereignty and international personality
is the confederation, which is a treaty based association of sovereign states. The confederated states
voluntarily choose to assign to the central authorities particular functions and powers in order to serve
particular purposes. Confederal activity is usually limited to certain essential areas such as defence or
foreign relations, where a union of states better serves the interests of the separate sovereign members.
The confederated states are linked through their governments and decisions are taken on the basis of
unanimity. Citizens of a confederation retain the nationality of the sovereign confederated state.
A confederation may of course represent the first step in a move towards federation. In such a case the
confederation chooses to adopt a constitution and thereby transform into a federation. While in
substance of competences may little change, for international public law the step is crucial. The move
to a constitutional structure implies a change in the international personality of the states (from two or
more states to one). Thus, while the member states of a confederation have a unilateral right to secede,
in a federation they do not.
On the basis of negotiating actors’ interests, a possible solution for Cyprus could be one
which moves away from these standard constitutional recipes firmly rooted in the
nation-state language of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and selects elements of
both models coherently fitting them in a wider regional framework, i.e. the European
Union.
Let us turn first to the internal features of a constitutional settlement in Cyprus. In the
context of the ‘Cyprus conflict’, employing the terms federation and confederation with
their standard interpretation appears particularly fruitless not simply because of the
current diametrically opposed elite positions, but also because as cases such as Belgium
suggest, workable solutions exist with marked elements of both models.
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An interesting solution in Cyprus could be the ‘common state’, a term used in the
constitutional debate of the two major conflicts in the South Caucasus: Nagorno
Karabakh and Abkhazia. The ‘common state’ has neither a clear legal definition nor it
has ever been implemented in practice. However it may been defined as a confederal
model in which member states do not have a unilateral right to secede, and where
foreign policy is delegated to the confederal authorities. The common state model does
not fit in easily with conventional state models as it would essentially imply a federation
(given the single exterhal sovereignty of the state) driven by an essentially confederal
logic. It may nonetheless be a useful model in the case of Cyprus particularly if
projected into the post-nation state world of the European Union.
In Cyprus, arguably, the most important constitutional principle included in the
‘common state’ proposal would be that of non-hierarchical relations between authorities
and the dominant use of unanimity rule within central institutions. Non-hierarchical
relations in cases where one community represents a distinct numerical majority are
fundamental in order to ensure the respect of the principle of political equality often
cited in UN resolutions for Cyprus but interpreted in contrasting ways by the two
conflicting parties. The two entities in the island, recognising their potential common
interests and purposes could discuss and develop common policies in a number of
government areas and consequently form a central authority in which the principle of
unanimity would prevail. Hence, the crucial difference between such an arrangement
and a classic federation, in which sovereignty unambiguously lies in the central level
representing the entire population and thus in which majority rule prevails.
However, the ‘common state’ solution would envisage that secession would only be
permitted if agreed by both units. Here one can notice how the proposed solution also
differs from a classic confederation, which resting upon an international treaty may be
unilaterally broken by any of the sovereign entities at any time.
In the case of a Cyprus, Greek and Turkish Cypriot units would be recognised within
the common state structure and not as separate sovereign states. Both units would have
separate, mutually recognised yet linked constitutions. Hence, a Turkish Cypriot entityNathalie Tocci
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would become internationally recognised, but the Greek Cypriots and the international
community would not be called to recognise the TRNC’s independence, but to
recognise a Turkish Cypriot unit within the ‘common state’ of Cyprus. On the grounds
of their status, asymmetric relations could also be established between the units and
foreign states in particular spheres of competence. Hence, Turkish Cypriots could
formalise links with Turkey and Greek Cypriots with Greece independently of each
other and on an equal standing as the independent and recognised states.
In terms of citizenship, one could envisage a single but differentiated citizenship.
Although the peoples of the island would have a Cypriot passport, the latter would be
issued by the separate units and would indicate the community of origin of the passport
holder.
As far as foreign representations and membership of international organisations and the
EU are concerned, Cyprus would be treated as a single entity, which would nonetheless
include voices from both units. In the case of EU membership, intra-EU institutional
realities imply that the Union could only afford one new member standing for Cyprus
and thus the two distinct units. How could a single membership operate? In areas such
as regional funds and the Committee of the Regions, similar arrangements as those
existing for other countries with defined regional structures could be envisaged,
whereby one representant from each unit would be present. As far as membership of the
Council of Ministers and the European Commission, where only one representant could
be present, either a system of rotation or one of division of posts would have to be
agreed upon. Alternatively in the Council of Ministers a system of split votes could be
envisaged
31. In either case, the central level in the ‘common state’ would have to
provide the necessary forums in which to ensure either common stances or effective
coordination.
Turning to the role of a central authority in Cyprus in greater detail, we suggest that in
the initial stages of the settlement, other than foreign representation, the central
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authority would be responsible for providing experience of joint governance and
minimising conflict. It would thus provide inter-communal forums for conflict
resolution and policy discussion particularly on issues which in the long-run could be
determined and managed by the same. One could also foresee that in order to ensure the
efficacy of these policy forums at central level, a High Representative appointed by the
international community could be permanently based on the island to carry out a
mediating role. Depending on what the ‘first best’ or ‘unconstrained’ constitutional
arrangement may be, in the longer term as the bases of conflict gradually erode, the
central government could develop competence in foreign trade policy, customs policy,
monetary and fiscal policy and possibly also public health and infrastructure policy. If
this were to occur, it would have to be accompanied with the creation of an all-island
parliament as well as a central level constitution compatible with the separate
constitutions of the units. However, the main innovation of this approach is that a
devolution of power to the central level would only occur if, as the bases of the conflict
erode, the two separate units agree that optimality calls for a strong central government.
Below we will expand further on the dynamics of such an agreement, a major argument
for its desirability.
Such a solution appears to be one of if not the only viable option for the Turkish Cypriot
elites. As stated above the Turkish Cypriot political elite, having effectively governed as
a de facto state for twenty-six years, would not agree to an immediate renunciation of
their control over the TRNC and thus agree to anything but a horizontal arrangement
with some form of differentiated citizenship. This would represent a two-fold gain for
the Turkish Cypriots who would not only retain control over their de facto state and
gain international recognition as an entity in Cyprus, but would also enjoy a significant
boost to their economy. Recognition would revamp the potentially competitive
agricultural sector, removing restrictions on international tourism and increasing foreign
aid receipts.
Such a constitutional arrangement also offers some attractions to the Greek Cypriot
elite. For example, retaining a two-unit system would imply lower economic costs to the
Greek Cypriot community. Under a federal arrangement, federal taxation andNathalie Tocci
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redistribution would imply a considerable burden on the more prosperous Greek Cypriot
community
32. In the light of escalating economic disparities, a federal fiscal policy
today would imply an even greater economic burden on the Greek Cypriot community
and may not prove to be a viable outcome fostering peace and coexistence. A looser
system instead would offer the Greek Cypriots the economic gains that can be derived
from increased economic contact without the costs of having to continuously
redistribute to their poorer partners. Furthermore, the constraints on secession would
ensure Greek Cypriot elites that such an arrangement would not simply represent a first
step to a permanent and legally sanctioned division of the island.
b) The desirability of a dynamic ‘common state’ solution
Any static agreement would be undesirable in so far as it would not necessarily
represent the ‘ideal’ or ‘unconstrained’ arrangement within a conflict-free situation.
Such a proposition seems particularly relevant for Cyprus, which unlike most other
cases of ethnic conflict, has witnessed explicit dispute and division for thirty-seven
years. In the context of the Cyprus conflict, a dynamic constitutional settlement appears
a vital ingredient for the successful resolution of the conflict. An initial arrangement
should only represent the first step towards the elimination of inter-communal barriers
which would in turn allow the natural establishment of the first-best solution. Once the
inter-communal conflict erodes and elements of shared identity are enhanced,
constitutional arrangements could evolve symbiotically. Hence, the powers and
functions entrusted to the central government for example would not be static, and it is
possible to envisage that with growing experience of joint governance, the authority of
the central government could grow accordingly. History includes several cases of
federations evolving by aggregation rather than disaggregation. Examples include the
Netherlands (1579-1795), the US (1776-1787), Switzerland (1815-1848) and Germany
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(1815-1866). The possibility of transforming into a tighter federal state would clearly
depend upon the gradual dissolution of the inter-communal conflict.
The time involved in such a process explains why both initial unilateral secession
clauses and the immediate creation of powerful central institutions would be
undesirable. On the one hand, initial restrictions on secession would be necessary to
prevent an initial solution from being a first step to secession and to allow a sufficient
period of time for the two political entities to constructively learn to work together. One
cannot exclude however, that as conflict erodes, the two units mutually agree to
disengage and transform into separate states. On the other hand, the immediate creation
of a tight federation would be unsustainable. A successful federation, while not
necessarily requiring the backing of a single nation should at least be supported by
peacefully coexisting communities. In the words of Andrew Mango: ‘a marriage cannot
be valid, let alone be happy, without mutual consent’
33. History from the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia teaches that artificial and involuntary federations are
likely to fail in the long-term. A similar lesson can be learnt from Cyprus itself in the
1960s. If a tight federal arrangement failed in the 1960s, it is even more likely to fail
after almost four decades of division and conflict. Unlike other cases of ethnic conflict,
in which constitutional solutions may also envisage very high degrees of autonomy, in
Cyprus, the immediate creation of a central authority legally entrusted with several
policy areas would not be advisable because of the duration of the unsolved conflict and
the lack of experience in joint governance. Immediate close contact both in governance
and in community activity without common experience, norms and values would create
deadlocks in decision-making and inter-communal tension, which may ultimately
destroy the bases of the settlement rather than consolidate them
34. Hence, the
desirability of a fluid arrangement which would allow the two community elites to
gradually and voluntarily proceed to the first best arrangement when constraints
imposed by the existing dynamics of the conflict are removed. Such a first best
arrangement attained as the conflict erodes may well be a tight federation. But
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regardless of what the ‘first best’ may be, it will only be achieved once an initial
sustainable settlement is enacted arguably in the form of a dynamic arrangement.
c) Territorial readjustment, refugee questions, demilitarisation, immigration policy and
the three freedoms of movement, settlement and property
A ‘common state’ arrangement without additional elements of a solution would be
entirely unacceptable particularly to the Greek Cypriot elites, who would lose their
international political and economic supremacy without adequate compensation. Other
issues need to be considered.
First, on the question of territory allocation, an initial solution would imply land
redistribution between the two communities. As it stands the territorial distribution ratio
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is 63:37 although population ratios are 74:24
35.
Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots are in control of the island’s two water springs (Kythrea
and Lapithos), a high proportion of the potential of total cultivated land (including the
cereal producing Mesaoria Plain, the tobacco growing Karpass Peninsula and the citrus
rich Kyrenia district), the largest port on the island (Famagusta) and the potentially
major tourist resorts along the coast of Kyrenia and Famagusta. In return for the Turkish
Cypriot international recognition and in the light of the Greek Cypriot strong bargaining
position post-Helsinki, compromise would include substantial alteration of land
allocation ratios. Land reallocation could in general follow the map
36 proposed by the
1992 ‘Set of Ideas’
37 which reallocates territory on a 29:71 basis and allows boundaries
to run across Famagusta and Nicosia up to the southern tip of the Morphou Bay.
However, in return for international recognition of a Turkish Cypriot entity in Cyprus,
there could be greater territorial concessions to the Greek Cypriots than those suggested
by the Ghali map. In particular, it could be argued that territorial readjustments could
give Greek Cypriots 73-5% of all territory. The additional 2-4% of territory could come
from the Morphou Bay, where arguably the line could run along Fyllia, Masari, the
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Serrachis river up to Morphou and then again run along the river up to the western
coast
38.
Land redistribution would resolve automatically a substantial part of the pressing
refugee question given the transfer of land and property currently administered by the
TRNC to the Republic of Cyprus. Under the Ghali map around 100,000 Greek
Cypriots
39 could automatically return to their home land. This figure would be clearly
higher under a 27-5:73-5 ratio where additional land would be transferred from the
Morphou area formerly densely inhabited by Greek Cypriots. Well over half the number
of Greek Cypriots displaced people would be automatically transferred to their own
unit.
This leaves unsolved the questions of remaining Greek Cypriot displaced people and of
old and newly created Turkish Cypriot displaced people. On these questions, some of
the proposals of the ‘Set of Ideas’ could be endorsed. First, there could be a voluntary
exchange of property between Greek Cypriot property in the Turkish Cypriot
administered zone and Turkish Cypriot property in the Greek Cypriot administered
zone. These exchanges would take place as a substitute to compensation for those who
are eligible for it. The ‘Set of Ideas’ suggests the creation of two communal agencies
dealing with these matters. Second, there could be adequate compensation for those
who own property in the opposing unit but do not wish to live under the latter. Clearly,
the redrawing of territorial boundaries will increase the numbers of Turkish Cypriots in
this position. Compensation could take the form of comparable property and housing in
one’s own unit. Funds for compensation could be acquired from the expropriation of all
remaining Greek Cypriot private property in the Turkish Cypriot administered zone and
all Turkish Cypriot private property in the Greek Cypriot administered zone, in which
the owners do not wish to move back to and which are not occupied by displaced
people. Third, there could be the right of return to Greek Cypriots driven from northern
territories where they owned property and vice versa for Turkish Cypriots. However, in
cases where former property is occupied by displaced people including Anatolian
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settlers rooted in Cyprus, compensation could be provided in the form of housing and
property either in the same area or in the area administered by one’s own community.
Second, on the question of the militarisation, while both parties would be expected to
make concessions, Turkish Cypriots could be called to make greater adjustments.
Although a final settlement of the problem of militarisation may not be stipulated
immediately, initial demonstrations of goodwill would be imperative. Both communities
could demonstrate their commitment to peace by diminishing their military spending,
reducing the presence of Greek and Turkish troops under the supervision of
international forces and not allowing new weapons on the island. Given the greater
extent of militarisation in the north, greater concessions would be expected from the
Turkish Cypriot community. An initial settlement could envisage the re-scaling of
foreign troops as stated in the 1960 Treaty of Alliance as well as a plan for the longer-
term demilitarisation of the island monitored by international forces.
Third, on the question of Anatolian settlers, an initial agreement would have to include
the Turkish Cypriot commitment repatriate to Turkey a proportion of Anatolian settlers
who have not yet taken root in Cyprus. Such a provision would be crucial for a long-
lasting peace in Cyprus for three principal reasons. First because settlers alter the
demographic structure of the island and thus induce Greek Cypriots’ fear and suspicion.
Second, Anatolian settlers are closely linked to Turkey and therefore hinder the
enhancement of those elements of shared identity which could complement separate
communal identities. Third, a partial repatriation of settlers would increase availability
of property to be employed for compensation to displaced people.
Finally, on the question of the ‘three freedoms’, as proposed by the ‘Set of Ideas’ an
initial settlement could envisage the full liberalisation of the freedom of movement for
all citizens subject to normal police functions, but continued restrictions on freedoms of
settlement and property in the medium term. Freedom of movement appears to be a
pressing necessity of everyday life on a small Mediterranean island and should thus be
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incorporated immediately in an initial settlement. It would also foster social, cultural
and economic links between the two communities as well as encourage the phased
reduction of inter-communal economic inequalities by allowing migrant Turkish
Cypriots to work in the more flourishing southern economy. However, the liberalisation
of freedoms of settlement and property, while equally desirable in the long term, would
prove problematic in the short-run if incorporated in an initial settlement, given the
glaring economic disparities between the two communities. Turkish Cypriots would
refuse an initial liberalisation of these freedoms fearing the total domination of the
richer Greek Cypriots over their land. Hence, for the first five to ten years, until material
conditions are sufficiently re-balanced it is unrealistic to expect a full liberalisation of
the freedoms of settlement and property throughout the island of Cyprus.
3. Confidence building measures following an agreement
Long-lasting settlement to the ‘Cyprus question’ can only be attained with the
comprehensive ‘desecuritisation’ of the underlying inter-communal conflict. In order to
‘desecuritise’ the inter-communal conflict it is crucial to eradicate those conditions of
division and disparity causing and exacerbating the ‘Cyprus question’ and rendering its
deep-rooted resolution increasingly difficult. Only once these conditions are removed it
will become possible to move towards a meaningful resolution of the ‘Cyprus question’,
i.e., a resolution of the conflict between communities. As mentioned above some
measures could be taken prior to an agreement between conflicting parties. However,
more comprehensive action could and should be taken immediately after an initial
agreement.
a) Building experience of shared governance
First, on the question of separate governance, it has already been suggested that an
initial solution would encourage cooperation and the development of shared norms and
values between governing elites by institutionalising inter-communal dialogue and
consultation at the central authority level supported by the mediating role of a High
Representative especially on matters which could be ultimately devolved to the central
level. Such mechanisms would gradually develop experience of joint governance, thus
eliminating the first condition of inter-communal division on the island. In addition toNathalie Tocci
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such provisions, there should also be important institutional mechanisms to encourage
increased joint political participation at lower levels of the political system. The central
authority could be responsible for the creation and coordination of joint policy forums
between top-level state representatives as well as between lower-lever political
authorities and between external bodies such as trade unions and other lobbying entities
within the policy-making arena. It is crucial to involve as many sectors of the
population as possible in joint workshops and discussion groups on the political
resolution of the conflict and the possible areas of shared governance on the island.
These micro-level initiatives would allow peoples to understand each other and endorse
wider perspectives on the conflict, thus serving both an educational and a political
purpose.
b) Increasing social and cultural inter-communal relations
As mentioned above, efforts to establish social and cultural inter-communal relations
already exist and could be greatly encouraged even prior to an agreement. However,
until an agreement is found, these activities are severely restricted by the green line
separating the two peoples. Once this line begins to be severed through an initial
settlement and the accompanying freedom of movement, a comprehensive program
designing and organising joint activities and exchanges between sporting, social,
cultural and educational institutions should be enacted thus beginning to give life to a
shared civil society on the island. Furthermore, integrated schools should be established
and books, press and media should be carefully screened to eliminate biased perceptions
and opinions. Several joint universities should be established educating together the
academic elite of the island.
c) Re-balancing economic disparities
Opening the Republic of Cyprus’ labour market would indeed contribute to the
reduction of socio-economic inequalities. However, the progressive narrowing of
economic inequalities would be greatly facilitated with effective termination of
international ostracisation of northern Cyprus following an agreement. International
trade would allow the potential comparative advantages of northern Cyprus such as
agriculture and tourism to be fully exploited. Northern Cyprus would benefitThe ‘Cyprus Question’
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substantially from foreign direct investment, which is currently deterred by the political
status of the self-declared state and the persisting conflict. International recognition and
settlement would also increase aid receipts in northern Cyprus, given the Turkish
Cypriot administration would begin to administer a proportionate share of overall
foreign aid.
d) Eliminating the Greek-Turkish rivalry
Fourth and final is the overarching Greek-Turkish conflict, which adds additional
momentum to the internal ethnic conflict in Cyprus. A reduction or elimination of the
centuries long rivalry between the two nations is crucial for an ultimate resolution of the
‘Cyprus question’. The increased rapprochement between Greece and Turkey since
August 1999 and with the high level meetings between Greek Foreign Minister George
Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart Ismail Cem in January and February 2000 are
crucially important developments. Beginning with the ‘earthquake diplomacy’ over the
summer of 1999 and developing into nine agreements on cooperation in economic,
technological, scientific, environmental, tourism, investment, customs, education and
anti-terrorism matters, confidence between the two historical rivals is rapidly building
up. Initial cooperation on relatively unproblematic issues should be encouraged in order
to avoid the mistakes made in 1988, when the ‘Davos spirit’ evaporated once the two
parties began linking their discussions to their most pressing area of discord, namely
Cyprus
40. Strong international support for such a process and most crucially the
development of the adequate framework within which the two countries could gradually
come to discuss their disputes would facilitate the enhancement of shared elements of
communal identity thus aiding the dissolution of the ‘Cyprus question’.
4. The role of the EU in promoting peace in Cyprus
The changes necessary to build durable peace in Cyprus are numerous and all-
encompassing and require an irrevocable effort and commitment. They involve not only
an initial settlement between elites accounting for the latter’s interests but would also
call for a progressive elimination of those conditions fostering inter-communal conflict
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over the longer-term. However, the task of bringing about a permanent settlement of the
Cyprus conflict could be rendered both speedier and less costly if incorporated in the
overall framework of the EU.
But what has been the role of the European Union in the ‘Cyprus question’ so far? Up
until the 1990s, the EU’s approach to the ‘Cyprus question’ was one of caution and
unequivocal support for the UN resolutions
41. The situation reversed in the 1990s, when
following the Republic of Cyprus application to EU membership the Union was
effectively internalised in the conflict.
In July 1990 the Republic of Cyprus presented its application for EC membership.
Despite a memorandum sent by the TRNC deploring the application of the Republic of
Cyprus on behalf of the whole island, the Commission’s 1993 Opinion endorsed by the
Council deemed Cyprus eligible for membership and its accession possible following
the resolution of the conflict. The Opinion stated that the economic obstacles to Cyprus’
accession are not insurmountable and mainly relate to the island-wide economic
disparities. But given the small size of the island a rapid economic catch-up with
average EU standards could be feasible. Adoption of the EU aqcuis is also far from
complete but again difficulties do not appear insuperable.
The Opinion was followed by technical talks between Cyprus and the Union in order to
allow the former to familiarise with the acquis. Following the conclusion of the
technical talks in 1995, Cyprus embarked on a structured accession dialogue with the
Union, in the light of the 1995 Corfu summit in which the EU formally recognised
Cyprus and Malta in the next stage of the enlargement process. In 1995 Cyprus was
granted a fourth financial protocol of 210m euros which took a distinctive pre-accession
character. In 1998 the Republic of Cyprus began accession negotiations with the Union
as agreed in the 1995 Madrid Summit’s ‘historic’ package deal brokered by the French
presidency, which linked Cyprus’ accession negotiations to Greece’s removal of the
veto on the EU-Turkey customs union. So far Cyprus has participated to two rounds of
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ministerial negotiations which provisionally closed ten chapters of the negotiations.
Since the initiation of accession negotiations, the precondition of conflict resolution
prior to EU membership has not been discussed. In the December 1999, the Helsinki
European Council formally abandoned this precondition.
What explains the Greek Cypriot application for EU membership in 1990? There are
two principal reasons behind the Republic of Cyprus’s aim to incorporate the entire
island in the European integration project. First, there is a strong economic rationale
behind the Republic of Cyprus’s application to the Union. EU membership would
ensure free access to a large and dynamic market for the small and open economy of
Cyprus, a market with whom the Republic of Cyprus already carries out 47% of its total
trade
42. More specifically, Cyprus would gain from its inclusion in the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Second, and most important there are political strategic
reasons why the Republic of Cyprus would gain from EU membership. The inclusion of
Cyprus in the Union with the Republic of Cyprus acting as the spokesman for the
country would further discredit the self-proclaimed TRNC and strengthen the Greek
Cypriot position in the bargaining process. For example, with Cyprus and Greece in the
Union and Turkey still in the accession process, while any Greek from the mainland
would be able to buy property and set up a business on the island, Turks would not
enjoy any of these rights unless special EU provisions were devised
43.
The Turkish Cypriots on the other hand strongly reject Cyprus’ application to the EU
and the subsequent evolution of the relations between the southern Republic and the
Union for three principal reasons. First, they regard the application illegitimate given it
was submitted by the Republic of Cyprus on behalf of the whole island although the
Turkish Cypriot population recognises the TRNC as their legitimate authority. Second,
they regard the application illegal because it violates the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee
which states that Cyprus would not participate either wholly or in part to any political or
economic union with another state, or to any international organisations unless both
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Greece and Turkey participated as well
44. As long as Greece is a member of the Union
and Turkey is not, Turkish Cypriots fear that Cyprus’ EU accession would effectively
imply a ‘backdoor route’ to attain enosis
45. Third, they reject the application and the
subsequent evolution of the relations between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU given
the Union’s position vis-à-vis the ‘Cyprus question’. The EU’s support for UN
resolutions implied its non-recognition of the TRNC and its exclusive relations with the
Greek Cypriot Republic. This stance somewhat hardened following the 1988 Coste-
Floret report and the closer ties between Greek Cypriots and the EU within the
enlargement process. This in turn led to the Turkish Cypriot refusal to participate to
accession talks, in so far as participation to a Cypriot delegation without veto rights
would effectively serve Greek Cypriot aims of a federation, and induced the deeper
integration of the TRNC with Turkey
46. Although the Turkish Cypriot community
favours EU accession in the long-run, it holds that accession should only take place
following a resolution of the conflict.
Currently therefore the introduction of the EU variable into the complex dynamics of
the ‘Cyprus question’ has merely served to exacerbate the conflict by reducing Greek
Cypriot incentives to broker a political settlement, consolidating political, social,
cultural and economic inter-communal divisions and inducing the TRNC’s closer ties
with Turkey. The EU has thus further ‘securitised’ rather than ‘desecuritised’ the
conflict in the 1990s
47. Since the Republic of Cyprus initiated accession negotiations in
1998 direct relations between the two community elites have been absent. Nonetheless
the Union could ultimately act as one of the, if not the principal factor facilitating peace
on the island. Via which routes could the EU play a constructive role in conflict
resolution?
a) Including Turkish Cypriots in relations with the EU
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The EU’s role in the Cyprus conflict can only be constructive if it is balanced. The first
imperative is therefore to incorporate the Turkish Cypriots in any relations but
especially in accession negotiations between Cyprus and the Union. Given political
constraints, this could be possible once an initial agreement is brokered and the Turkish
Cypriot administration is recognised as a political equal to the Greek Cypriot
administration in accession negotiations and ultimately within the Union. An additional
incentive for the Turkish Cypriots is provided by a rapprochement between Turkey and
the Union. Although political and economic realities suggest that Cyprus may become
an EU member before Turkey, greater ties between the latter country and the Union
reversing the post-Luxembourg deadlock, could be conducive to the establishment of
relations between the Turkish Cypriots and the EU. Once both communities are
incorporated in relations with the EU and are ultimately included as one Union member,
a constructive role of the latter could be envisaged. Concretely, the EU could foster
peace in Cyprus in the following ways.
b) The EU’s role facilitating the functioning of an initial agreement
First, the EU could facilitate the implementation of an initial agreement between the two
inter-communal elites by taking some of the pressure off the units. Four problematic
areas of the above mentioned solution would be the role of the military, the operation of
monetary policy, status of displaced people and the liberalisation of the three freedoms
of movement, settlement and property.
 i. The EU’s role in the defence and security of Cyprus
On the question of the military, we have already noted that a long-run solution cannot
be attained in the short-term while inter-communal divisions are still wide. However the
EU could both render this interim period smoother and shorter, and ensure the
successful attainment of longer-run goals. During the interim period, military forces in
Cyprus could be incorporated in the wider European defence arrangement, where a
European Rapid Deployment Force could be stationed in the presently British bases of
Dhekelia and Akrotiri in order to monitor the activities of Greek, Turkish and Greek and
Turkish Cypriot military forces. Clearly both Greece and Turkey would contribute to a
European defence initiative in Cyprus despite the latter’s non-membership of the EU inNathalie Tocci
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the medium term. This is first and foremost necessary to ensure the Turkish Cypriot
acceptance of the plan and compliance with the terms of the Treaty of Alliance and
Article 3 of the Treaty of Establishment
48. Moreover, the participation of both Greek
and Turkish troops would also provide an additional arena of cooperation between the
two historic rivals within an EU structure. In the longer-term, European forces could
assist the gradual demilitarisation of the island, as specified in the initial agreement
creating the desirable environment for stability and security in Cyprus.
 ii. The EU’s role in the monetary policy of Cyprus
On the question of monetary policy, a major disadvantage of a common state structure
would be the possible operation of two distinct monetary authorities, two monetary
policies and two circulating currencies implying a lack of uniformity in services and
payments. Moreover, in so far as Turkish Cypriot monetary policy is effectively
determined by Turkish monetary authorities, the TRNC, like Turkey itself, has been
afflicted with rampant inflation and monetary instability, which exacerbates the gap
separating the economically stagnant north from the prosperous south.
A preferred solution to two distinct monetary policies in Cyprus would be the
immediate adoption of the euro and thus ECB determined monetary policy throughout
the island prior to EU membership. The Cypriot pound is already pegged to the euro on
a 2.25% fluctuation bound since 1999. The Turkish lira could enter a similar
arrangement until 2002 when both currencies are replaced by the euro. Financial circles
in northern Cyprus have frequently advocated the replacement of the Turkish lira by a
stronger currency such as the Cypriot pound, which is often used in estate transactions.
Bur persisting political conflict renders such an economically rational policy unviable.
The adoption of the euro in Cyprus could break this impasse by offering both a
politically viable and an economically sound alternative inducing the gradual
convergence of the two Cypriot economies.
 iii. The EU’s role in, in speeding up the liberalisation of the ‘three freedoms’ and
resolving the refugee problem in Cyprus
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If both Greek and Turkish Cypriot authorities participate to accession negotiations and
ultimately attain full membership, the Union could provide the adequate framework to
resolve the problems of the restricted freedoms of movement, property and settlement
and of displaced people on the island. Clearly, until economic disparities are bridged,
the full liberalisation of the freedoms of settlement and property cannot be attained, and
the EU would have to account for the specificity of the Cyprus case in the short and
medium term. Nonetheless, if both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities adopted the
Community acquis and operated within the EU single market framework, hidden
restrictions deriving from diverse communal systems would be more easily overcome
accelerating the ultimate attainment of full freedoms of settlement and property.
This, together with Cyprus’ incorporation in the EU’s third pillar of Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA) would also contribute to the resolution of the refugee problem on the
island. As mentioned above, one measure undertaken to resolve the refugee question
would be to allow the voluntary return of Greek Cypriots to their property in the north
and vice versa for Turkish Cypriots with property in the south if these are not occupied
by displaced people. The liberalisation of the three freedoms under the overarching
framework of the EU single market and the incorporation of Cyprus in the JHA pillar
would thus aid the rapid implementation of this measure. The EU could also ease the
refugee problem by contributing to the refugee compensation fund mentioned above.
This would be critical especially in the early days of an agreement when freedoms of
property and settlement would remain limited and therefore the persisting psycho-
political problem of displaced people could threaten the success of the peace settlement.
c) The EU’s role in resolving the underlying inter-communal conflict
In addition to measures facilitating the formulation and implementation of an initial
settlement, another route through which the EU could contribute to a lasting settlement
of the Cyprus conflict could be by speeding up the transition to the ultimate desirable
constitutional division of competences. By encouraging the eradication of the
underlying conditions fuelling inter-communal division, the EU could aid theNathalie Tocci
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enhancement of elements of shared identity, the ‘desecuritisation’ of the conflict and
consequently the ultimate attainment of an ‘unconstrained’ constitutional arrangement.
First, participating to supra-national European institutions would add a second
dimension to that provided by a central government within which Greek and Turkish
Cypriots could learn to cooperate in joint governance. Especially in the light of the EU
institutional constraints allowing only one single Cypriot membership, Greek and
Turkish Cypriots would have an additional incentives to work together and find
common ground. Working together to support the national Cypriot interest within a
wider context of European cooperation would increase the scope or common goals
between inter-communal elites and accelerate the formation of shared norms and values.
This may be particularly true within an enlarged EU, in which broad regional coalitions
may form on the basis of shared interests within the European forum.
Second, the EU could encourage and finance numerous social and cultural initiatives
through which members of the two communities could enhance their relations and
contacts. Under the European Social Fund, EU member states decide whether and how
to give priority to their cultural programmes. Such programmes are eligible to EU
funding either under objective 1
49 or under the new objective 2 in which cultural
programmes are accepted if they are shown to be a source of employment enabling local
and regional development. This implies that programmes have to cover one of the
following policy fields, namely: active labour market policies to counter
unemployment, the promotion of social cohesion, education and training systems to
promote employability and the anticipation and facilitation of social change and equal
opportunities for men and women. These goals could to a large extent be compatible
with social and cultural programmes, serving to create inter-communal links in Cyprus.
Third the EU could encourage inter-communal economic contact and the reduction of
economic disparities. While a resolution to the ‘Cyprus question’ may not be a
precondition to the Republic of Cyprus’ EU accession, the EU could include the lifting
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of the Greek and Greek Cypriot economic blockades on northern Cyprus as a
precondition to accession
50. Hence, economic contact would resume and disparities
would begin to even out. Following the EU membership of a ‘resolved’ Cyprus,
inclusion in the EC single market would then imply even closer economic relations
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots as well as an acceleration of economic
development in the north. Inclusion in a European single market would benefit
economically both communities. But in the light of the existing disparities between the
regions caused to a large extent by the TRNC’s international non-recognition, EU
accession is bound to benefit the northern regions in particular and thus contribute to a
progressive narrowing of inter-communal economic disparities. In addition to trade, the
Turkish Cypriot economy would also gain from proportional shares of EU aid and
structural funds following EU accession. As calculated in annex 5, the Turkish Cypriot
community would benefit from approximately 500 euro per capita, implying a rise of
12.5% GDP per capita.
Finally, the EU could contribute to a reduction of the underlying Greek-Turkish rivalry
by integrating Turkey closely in EU affairs. This would first induce Turkey to settle its
disputes with Greece and second, following Turkey’s inclusion in the Union, the EU
would provide a single umbrella within which the two countries could manage their
affairs. So far the Union has appeared to act as an additional arena in which the Greek-
Turkish rivalry could be fought. Since the mid-1980s, Greece has directed its foreign
policy vis-à-vis Turkey towards incorporating the disputes between Athens and Ankara
within the wider EU framework. Most notably, Greece has repeatedly used its veto
power in EC decision-making to block the implementation of the 4
th Financial Protocol
to Turkey and applied the policy of conditionality to the ‘Cyprus question’. However,
the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, which began in August 1999 with the
‘earthquake diplomacy’ between the rival countries paved the way for Turkey’s formal
incorporation in the EU enlargement process. Turkey’s closer links with the Union
could in turn facilitate the ultimate resolution of Greek-Turkish territorial disputes. The
Helsinki Council conclusions called for the resolutions of territorial disputes preferably
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through political settlement, but failing that through recourse to the International Court
of Justice. One week before the December 1999 Council, former Turkish President
Demirel accepted the possibility of an ICJ adjudication of Greek-Turkish territorial
conflicts. Hence, the increased likelihood of Turkey’s EU membership is creating
positive dynamics towards a resolution of Greek-Turkish points of contention,
explaining Greece’ recent insistence of a clear ‘road map’ for Turkey’s EU accession.
Greece seems to appreciate that a clearly defined accession process will give Turkey the
incentives to settle their disputes. But the EU’s role could go well beyond the
encouragement of Greek-Turkish territorial settlements. As Turkey gradually
approaches the EU family, Greece and Turkey would be able to conduct bilateral affairs
within the shared economic, security and civil society structure of the Union. Hence, the
progressive elimination of covered and unspoken differences between the two historical
rivals and the subsequent encouragement to a unification of the peoples of Cyprus.
d) The EU’s role in creating a post-modern state in Cyprus
More generally, the EU could contribute to a lasting settlement in Cyprus by
remoulding Cyprus as a ‘post-modern state’
51. The transformation of Cyprus from a
‘pre-modern’ state in which ‘state’ and ‘nation’ do not coincide, into a modern state
with single independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity as advocated by UN
resolutions is an unlikely outcome, which has prevented conflict resolution for over
three decades and which is becoming increasingly obsolete as time passes and inter-
communal division is further entrenched. However, the international system’s language
of the modern state has difficulty accepting fuzzier constitutional solutions, which may
more adequately capture realities on the ground. For example, in the rigid language of
the modern state, the proposal of a ‘common state’ implies an effective constiutional
contradiction. A ‘common state’ implies a union by treaty. But a voluntary treaty
between states, which may not be revoked unilaterally, would limit the external
sovereignty of the member states and thus be internally inconsistent.
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Yet such a constitutional solution could be possible if incorporated in the regional
environment of the EU. As the Belgian and Northern Irish models teach, the EU allows
an easing of perennial tensions between different ‘nations’ within one ‘state’, through
the transformation of the meaning of statehood itself as well as of key concepts such as
sovereignty and territorial integrity. When placed within the economic, monetary, and
future security and civil structures of the EU, rigid concepts of indivisible sovereignty
and territoriality gradually lose meaning. Hence, with the prospect and subsequent
reality of Cyprus’ accession, more complex ‘post-modern’ constitutional solutions for
Cyprus could be foreseen. This could be possible through two inter-related effects.
First, the prospect of Cyprus’ full EU membership and thus of the EU’s decision-
making roles in the economic, monetary, foreign, defence and justice policies of
Cyprus, would encourage the two parties’ acceptance of a non-hierarchical arrangement
within one formally recognised state. Generally one would envisage that Greek Cypriot
elites would view favourably the transfer of competences from the units to the European
level, while Turkish Cypriot elites would be more willing to devolve power to the
supra-national than to the central level.
Second, the transformation of Cyprus into a ‘post-modern state’ would facilitate the
ultimate creation of an optimal constitutional arrangement (whatever this may be) by
reducing the importance of separate sovereignties and systems of governance. Within
the all-encompassing European umbrella in which the mutual interference in domestic
affairs is the norm and the philosophy of subsidiarity is rapidly developing, the
distinctions between confederations, federations and unified states will become
increasingly blurred. Secession from a state but not from the Union or reintegration in a
unified state with regions retaining not only internal competences but also external roles
in an enhanced Europe of the Regions would both become relatively unproblematic.
The prospect of EU membership would thus facilitate the attainment of an initial non-
hierarchical settlement, while the reality of membership would act as a catalyst for the
attainment of an optimal solution in which the two peoples of Cyprus peacefully
coexist.Nathalie Tocci
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IV. Summary and Conclusions
Many approaches to the ‘Cyprus question’, including that of the UN itself, envisage a
resolution of the conflict based on a reunification of the island and the close interaction
between the communities sharing a same identity and purpose. However, agreeing upon
and thereafter operating such a solution after over thirty years of conflict is first of all
unfeasible and second it is arguably undesirable. Once we situate ourselves in a second-
best world different options need to be considered. The approach adopted in this study
involves an analysis of the conflict from two distinct levels.
First, it is important to recognise that the conflict in Cyprus is not simply one between
states, but above all one between peoples, a conflict which began under Ottoman and
British domination but which gained a momentum of its own during decades of
separation following 1963. The inter-communal conflict can only be resolved if the
underlying conditions fostering it are eradicated. Hence, the need to build experience of
shared governance, to increase and deepen inter-communal social, cultural and
economic links, to work towards the economic equality of the two communities and to
ease the underlying Greek-Turkish rivalry. But many of these conditions can only be
removed once an initial settlement between the negotiating parties is brokered. This
takes us to the second dimension of the ‘Cyprus question’: the inter-elite conflict.
Adopting a game theoretic approach, this study shows that an initial proposed
settlement must represent a preferred alternative to the status quo for both parties in
order to be viable.
Hence, the suggestion of a non-hierarchical ‘common state’ arrangement together with
territorial readjustments and clauses concerning refugee statuses, military capabilities
and the ‘three freedoms’. The main elements of an initial solution are summarised in
Boxes 2 and 3 below.The ‘Cyprus Question’
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                  Box 2: The initial agreement between state elites
• Common state solution
i Unit recognition within the common state. Units can secede only if agreed by both
parties
ii The central authority could evolve from a mainly policy discussion forum to a decision-
making body in select policy areas. The dynamic mechanism would be encouraged by
the
mediating role an internationally appointed High Representative.
iii Single but differentiated citizenship
iv Single foreign representation and membership of international organisations and the EU
• Territorial readjustments (see map)
• Refugee policy
i Voluntary exchange of property
ii Compensation
iii Right of return to property not occupied by displaced persons
• Military and defence policy
i Initial reduction of spending, sizing down of troops as provided for by the 1960 Treaty
of
Alliance and freezing the purchase of new weapons.
ii Gradual demilitarisation
• Settler policy. Halt the immigration of Turkish settlers and repatriate a proportion of
existing settlers
• Freedom of movement, property and settlement.
i Immediate liberalisation of the freedom of movement
ii Gradual liberalisation of the freedom of property and settlement
Box 3: Tackling the inter-communal conflict
• Increased experience in shared governance via the formation of inter-communal policy
forums at all government levels coordinated by the central authority
• Enhanced social, cultural and economic inter-communal relations with the elimination of
inter-communal restrictions and the construction of the necessary infrastructure to support
such projects. Open labour markets.
• Reduced inter-communal economic disparities via the removal of the economic embargo by
the Republic of Cyprus and the EU, encouraged FDI in northern Cyprus and the migration
of Turkish Cypriot workers in the southern economy
• Greek-Turkish rapprochement through strong international support for the current evolution
of diplomatic relations and the creation of a favourable institutional environment within the
EU frameworkNathalie Tocci
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The initial constitutional solution suggested in box 2 would first be viable in so far as it
could represent a preferred solution for all parties than the current status quo. Second,
the solution would be desirable in so far as it would tackle the underlying inter-
communal conflict and allow the ‘desecuritisation’ of the question through the measures
suggested in box 3. The solution would also be sustainable and preferred to the
traditional UN approach to the conflict because it would both diminish potential for
conflict during the initial stages of the settlement when goodwill and experience in
cooperation are still low, and represent a fluid arrangement encouraging inter-
communal contact to be followed by corresponding changes in governing arrangements.
In other words, a flexible initial solution would imply an inbuilt virtuous circle, as
growing experience of living and governing together would be followed by
accompanying shifts in institutional and legal arrangements until the most rational
constitutional solution would naturally arise. The effects of concerted efforts aimed at
eradicating the underlying conditions fostering inter-communal conflict would represent
an additional momentum to this ongoing process of settlement evolution, whose natural
end point would be the peace and prosperity of the peoples of Cyprus.
Box 4: The role of the EU in resolving the Cyprus conflict
• EU recognition of a Turkish Cypriot unit within a common state, treated as a political equal
to the Greek Cypriot unit in accession negotiations and ultimate EU membership
• EU role in the implementation of an initial agreement
i ERRF stationed in Dhekelia and Akrotiri initially ensuring stability and ultimately
monitoring demilitarisation
ii Full euorisation in both units by 2002
iii Immediate priority in both units of adopting the EU acquis regarding the freedom of
movement, more gradual adoption of acquis for the freedom of property and settlement.
iv EU insistence on Greek and Greek Cypriot lifting of the economic blockade on northern
Cyprus
• EU role in eliminating the inter-communal conflict
i Single EU membership encouraging joint decision-making at the supra-national level
ii Immediate full utilisation of the European Social Fund promoting inter-communal
relations
iii Immediate full utilisation of EU Structural Funds contributing to an elimination of
inter-
communal economic disparities
iv Full utilisation of the EU framework to encourage the Greek-Turkish rapprochementThe ‘Cyprus Question’
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The European Union is in a unique position to play an active role in promoting peace in
Cyprus (see Box 4). While the UN can at best represent a microcosm of the
international system and as such and as such stresses notions of sovereignty, territorial
integrity and independence, the European Union could successfully alter the context of
the Cyprus conflict by opening up the framework of the post-nation state order, thus
offering new and more complex solutions of power-sharing and division of
sovereignties. First, the prospect of EU membership could act as a facilitating factor in
the agreement and implementation of an initial solution by endorsing competences in
many crucial policy areas. Second, the reality of membership could act as a catalyst for
the attainment of an ultimate elimination of the conflict, both by encouraging the
elimination of those political, social, cultural and economic conditions of division and
by narrowing the substantive differences between formally opposed constitutional
arrangements. In this way Cyprus’ EU membership and the resolution of the deep-
rooted ‘Cyprus question’ could evolve together, reinforcing each other in a virtuous
circle of peace and prosperity.Nathalie Tocci
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Annex 1
Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Greece and
the Republic of Turkey of the one part and the Republic of Cyprus of the other part.
Desiring to make provisions to give effect to the Declaration made by the Government
of the United Kingdom on the 17th of February, 1959, during the Conference at
London, in accordance with the subsequent Declarations made at the Conference by the
Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, by the Representative of the Greek Cypriot
Community and by the Representative of the Greek Cypriot Community and by the
Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community.
Taking note of the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee signed today by the Parties;
Have agreed as follows.
ARTICLE 1
The territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall comprise the island of Cyprus, together
with the islands lying off its coast, with the exception of the two areas defined in Annex
A to this Treaty, which areas shall remain under the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom. These areas are in this Treaty and its Annexes referred to as the Akrotiri
Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area.
ARTICLE 2
The Republic of Cyprus shall co-operate fully with the United Kingdom to ensure the
security and effective operation of the military bases situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign
Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, and the full enjoyment by the United
Kingdom of the rights conferred by this Treaty.
ARTICLE 3
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult
and co-operate in the common defence of Cyprus.
ARTICLE 4
The arrangements concerning the status of forces in the Island of Cyprus shall be those
contained in Annex C to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 5
The Republic of Cyprus shall secure to everyone within its jurisdiction human rights
and fundamental freedoms comparable to those set out in section I of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental signed at Rome on 4
November, 1950, and the Protocol to that Convention signed at Paris on 20 March.
ARTICLE 6
The arrangements concerning the nationality of persons affected by the establishment of
the Republic of Cyprus shall be those contained in Annex D to this Treaty.The ‘Cyprus Question’
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ARTICLE 7
The Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom accept and undertake to carry out the
necessary financial and administrative arrangements to settle questions arising out of the
termination of British administration in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. These
arrangements are set forth in Annex E to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 8
(a) All international obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the United
Kingdom shall henceforth, in so far as they may be held to have application to the
Republic of Cyprus, be assumed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
(b) The international rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the
United Kingdom in virtue of their application to the territory of the Republic of
Cyprus shall henceforth be enjoyed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
ARTICLE 9
The Parties to this Treaty accept and undertake to carry out the arrangements
concerning trade, commerce and other matters set forth in Annex F to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 10
Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty shall
be settled as follows:
(a) Any question or difficulty that may arise over the operation of the military
requirements of the United Kingdom, or concerning the provisions of this Treaty in
so far as they affect the status, rights and obligations of United Kingdom forces or
any other forces associated with them under the terms of this Treaty, or of Greek,
Turkish and Cypriot forces, shall ordinarily be settled by negotiation between the
tripartite Headquarters of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and the
authorities of the armed forces of the United Kingdom.
(b) Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty on
which agreement cannot be reached by negotiation between the military authorities
in the cases described above, or, in other cases, by negotiation between the Parties
concerned through the diplomatic channel, shall be composed of four
representatives, one each to be nominated by the Government of the United
Kingdom, the Government of Greece, the Government of Turkey and the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus, together with an independent chairman
nominated by the President of the International Court of Justice. If the President is a
citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or of the Republic of Cyprus of Greece
or of Turkey, the Vice-President shall be requested to act; and, if he also is such a
citizen, the next senior Judge of the Court.
ARTICLE 11
The Annexes to this Treaty shall have force and effect as integral parts of this Treaty.
ARTICLE 12
This Treaty shall enter into force on signature by all the Parties to it.Nathalie Tocci
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Treaty of Guarantee
 The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part.
Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial
integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the
Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,
Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that
Constitution.
Have agreed as follows.
ARTICLE I
The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence,
territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution. It undertakes not
to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State
whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or
indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.
ARTICLE II
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the
Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee
the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also
the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution. Greece, Turkey
and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any
activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other
State or partition of the Island.
ARTICLE III
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the
areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the
Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the
rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty of
Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.
ARTICLE IV
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the
United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or
measure necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or
concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves
the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by
the present Treaty.
ARTICLE V
The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of
the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia. The High Contracting Parties shall
proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat




The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,
In their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of them,
Considering that their efforts for the preservation of peace and security are in
conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate for their common defence and to
consult together on the problems raised by that defence.
ARTICLE II
The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or
indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of
Cyprus.
ARTICLE III
For the purpose of this alliance, and in order to achieve the object mentioned above, a
Tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.
ARTICLE IV
Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so established with
the military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol No.I annexed to the present
Treaty.
The said contingents shall provide for the training of the army of the Republic of
Cyprus.
ARTICLE V
The Command of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation, for a period
of one year each, by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be
appointed respectively by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President
and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.
ARTICLE VI
The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The High Contracting
Parties shall conclude additional agreements if the application of the present Treaty
renders them necessary. The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible
with the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in




The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the Tripartite Headquarters shall
comprise respectively 950 Greek officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and 650 Turkish
officers, non-commissioned officers and men.
ARTICLE 2
The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may
request the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish
contingents.
ARTICLE 3
It is agreed that the sites of the cantonments for the Greek and Turkish contingents participating
in the Tripartite Headquarters, their juridical status, facilities and exemptions in respect of
customs and taxes, as well as other immunities and privileges and any other military and
technical questions concerning the organisation and operation of the Headquarters mentioned
above shall be determined by a Special Convention which shall come into force not later than
the Treaty of Alliance.
ARTICLE 4
It is likewise agreed that the Tripartite Headquarters shall be set up not later than three months
after the completion of the tasks of the Mixed. Commission for the Cyprus Constitution and
shall consist, in the initial period, of a limited number of officers charged with the training of
the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents mentioned
above will arrive in Cyprus on the date of signature of the Treaty of Alliance.
Additional Protocol n.2
ARTICLE I
A Committee shall be set up consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,
It shall constitute the supreme political body of the Tripartite Alliance and may take cognisance
of any question concerning the Alliance which the Governments of the three Allied countries
shall agree to submit to it.
ARTICLE II
The Committee of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session by its Chairman at the request of one
of the members of the Alliance. Decisions of the Committee of Ministers shall be unanimous.
ARTICLE III
The Committee of Ministers shall be presided over in rotation and for a period of one year, by
each of the three Foreign Ministers. It will hold its ordinary sessions, unless it is decided
otherwise, in the capital of the Chairman's country. The Chairman shall, during the year in
which he holds office, preside over sessions of the Committee of Ministers, both ordinary and
special. The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies whenever it shall judge it to be necessary
for the fulfilment of its task.
ARTICLE IV
The Tripartite Headquarters established by the Treaty of Alliance shall be responsible to the
Committee of Ministers in the performance of its functions. It shall submit to it, during the
Committee's ordinary session, an annual report comprising a detailed account of the





Adopted by the Security Council on 18 February 1964
Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international
peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly
taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution.
Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the treaties signed in
Nicosia on 16 August 1960.
Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations in its article
2 para.4 which reads: ‘all members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations’.
(a) Calls upon all member-states, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter
of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen
the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international
peace.
(b) Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance
and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop
violence and bloodshed in Cyprus.
(c) Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with utmost restraint.
(d) Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the
Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the
Government of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The commander
of the Force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The
Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the Force fully
informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation.
(e) Recommends that the function of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all
costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the
Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The
Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose.
(f) Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months,
all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the
Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The
Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose.
(g) Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the
Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United
kingdom, a mediator, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of
the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of
promoting a peaceful resolution and an agreed settlement of the problem
confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in
mind the wellbeing of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of
international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the
Secretary General on his efforts.Nathalie Tocci
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(h) Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as
appropriate, for the renumeration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.
RESOLUTION 353 (1974)
Adopted by the Security Council on 20 July 1974
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General at its 1779
th meeting about the
recent developments in Cyprus,
Having heard the statement made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the
statements by the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and other Member States.
Having considered at its present meeting further developments in the island.
Deeply deploring the outbreak of violence and continuing bloodshed,
Gravely concerned about the situation which led to a serious threat to international
peace and security, and which created a most explosive situation in the whole Eastern
Mediterranean area,
Equally concerned about the necessity to restore the constitutional structure of the
Republic of Cyprus, established and guaranteed by international agreement,
Recalling its resolution 186(1964) of 4 March 1964 and its subsequent resolutions on
this matter.
Conscious of this primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations.
(a) Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of Cyprus;
(b) Calls upon all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all firing and
requests all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action
which might further aggravate the situation:
(c) Demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in w the Republic of
Cyprus that is in contravention of paragraph 1 above;
(d) Requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign
military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international
agreements, including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the
Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2 July 1974;
(e) Calls upon Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to enter into negotiation without delay for the restoration of peace in the area
and constitutional government in Cyprus and to keep the Secretary-General
informed.
(f) Calls upon all parties to cooperate fully with the United Nations Peace-Keeping
Force in Cyprus to enable it to carry out its mandate;
(g) Decides to keep the situation under constant review and asks the Secretary-General
to report as appropriate with a view to adopting further measures in order to ensure
that peaceful conditions are restored as soon as possible.
Adopted unanimously at the 1781
st meeting.
RESOLUTION 367 (1975)
Adopted by the Security Council by consensus on 12 March 1975
Having considered the situation in Cyprus in response to the complaint submitted by the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus,The ‘Cyprus Question’
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Having heard the report of the Secretary-General and the statements made by the Parties
concerned,
Deeply concerned at the continuation of the crisis in Cyprus,
Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolution 365(1974) of 13 December
1974, by which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 32 12(XXIX) adopted
unanimously on 1 November 1974,
Noting the absence of progress towards the implementation of its resolutions
(a) Calls once more on all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial
integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and urgently requests them,
as well as the parties concerned, to refrain from any action which might prejudice t
hat sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment, as well as
from any attempt at partition of the island or its unification with any other country;
(b) Regrets the unilateral decision of 13 February 1975, declaring that a part of the
Republic of Cyprus would become a "Federated Turkish State" as, inter alia, tending
to compromise the continuation of negotiations between the representatives of the
two communities on an equal footing, the objective of which must continue to be to
reach freely a solution providing for a political settlement and the establishment of a
mutually acceptable constitutional arrangement, and expresses its concern over all
unilateral actions by the parties which have compromised or may compromise the
implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions:
(c) Affirms that the decision referred to in paragraph 2 above does not prejudge the
final political settlement of the problem of Cyprus and takes note of the declaration
that this was not its intention
(d) Calls for the urgent and effective implementation of all parts and provisions of
General Assembly resolution 3212(XXIX), endorsed by Security Council resolution
365(1974):
(e) Considers that new efforts should be undertaken to assist the resumption of the
negotiations referred to in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 3212(XXIX)
between the representatives of the two communities;
(f) Requests the Secretary-General accordingly to undertake a new mission of good
offices and to that end to convene the parties under new agreed procedures and place
himself personally at their disposal, so that the resumption, the intensification and
the progress of comprehensive negotiations, carried out in a reciprocal spirit of
understanding and of moderation under his personal auspices and with his direction
as appropriate, might thereby be facilitated;
(g) Calls on the representatives of the two communities to cooperate closely with the
Secretary-General in the discharge of this new mission of good offices and asks
them to accord personally a high priority to their negotiations;
(h) Calls on all the parties concerned to refrain from any action which might jeopardise
the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities and to take
steps which will facilitate the creation of the new climate necessary for the success
of those negotiations;
(i) Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of the
progress made towards the implementation of resolution 365(1974) and of this
resolution and to report to it whenever he considered it appropriate and, in any case,
before 15 June 1975;
(j) Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.Nathalie Tocci
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Adopted at the 1820th meeting without a vote.
RESOLUTION 649(1990)
Adopted by the Security Council on 12 March 1990
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 8 March 1990 (S/21183) on
the recent meeting between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus and on his
assessment of the current situation.
Recalling its relevant resolutions on Cyprus,
Recalling the statement of the President of the Security Council of 22 February
1990(S/21160) calling upon the leaders of the two communities to demonstrate the
necessary goodwill and flexibility and to cooperate with the Secretary-General so that
the talks will result in a major step forward toward the resolution of the Cyprus
problem,
Concerned that at the recent meeting in New York it has not been possible to achieve
results in arriving at an agreed outline of an overall agreement,
(a) Reaffirms in particular its resolution 367(1975) as well as its support for the 1977
and 1979 high-level agreements between the leaders of the two communities in
which they pledged themselves to establish a bi-communal Federal Republic of
Cyprus that will safeguard its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and
non-alignment, and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and
any form of partition or secession.
(b) Expresses its full support for the current effort of the Secretary-General in carrying
out his mission of good offices concerning Cyprus.
(c) Calls upon the leaders of the two communities to pursue their efforts to reach freely
a mutually acceptable solution providing for the establishment of a federation that
will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regard s
the territorial aspects in line with the present resolution and their 1977 and 1979
high-level agreements, and to cooperate, on an equal footing, with the Secretary-
General in completing, in the first instance and on an urgent basis, an outline of an
overall agreement, as agreed in June 1989.
(d) Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to
achieve the earliest possible progress and, towards this end, to assist the two
communities by making suggestions to facilitate the discussions.
(e) Calls on the parties concerned to refrain from any action that could aggravate the
situation.
(f) Decides to remain actively seized of this situation and the current effort.
(g) Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council in his report due by 31 May
1990 of the progress made in resuming the intensive talks and in developing an
agreed outline of an overall agreement in line with the present resolution.
Adopted unanimously at the 2909th meeting.
‘Set of Ideas’ (1992)
(a) Politically equal communities in a federal republic, but politically equal is not to
mean numerical equality in all institutions of government.
(b) A Greek Cypriot President and a Cypriot Turkish Vice-President both elected
universally.The ‘Cyprus Question’
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(c) Reductions of Cypriot Turkish territory as in the map to include Varosha/Maras and
part of the Morphou/Güzelyurt area.
(d) The right of refugees to return to their homes.
(e) The three freedoms (of movement, settlement and property).
RESOLUTION 789 (1992)
Adopted by the Security Council on 25 November 1992
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 19 November 1992 on his
mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/24830),
Noting with satisfaction that the two leaders discussed all the issues in the Set of Ideas
with the result that there were areas of agreement as noted in the report,
Welcoming the agreement by the two sides to meet again with the Secretary-General in
early March 1993 to complete the work on an agreed Set of Ideas,
(a) Reaffirms all its previous resolutions on Cyprus, including resolutions 365 (1974),
367 (1975), 541 (1983), 550 (1984) and 774 (1992),
(b) Endorses the report of the Secretary-General and commends him for his efforts.
(c) Reaffirms also its endorsement of the Set of Ideas including the territorial
adjustments reflected in the map contained in the annex to the report of the
Secretary-General of 21 August 1992 (2/S/24472) as the basis for reaching an
overall framework agreement,
(d) Reaffirms further its position that the present status quo is not acceptable and that an
overall agreement in line with the Set of Ideas should he achieved without further
delay;
(e) Notes that the recent joint meetings did not achieve their intended goal, in particular
because certain positions adopted by the Turkish Cypriot side were fundamentally at
variance with the Set of Ideas,
(f) Calls upon the Turkish Cypriot side to adopt positions that are consistent with the
Set of Ideas on those issues identified by the Secretary-General in his report, and for
all concerned to be prepared in the next round of talks to make decisions that will
bring about a speedy agreement,
(g) Recognises that the completion of this process in March 1993 would be greatly
facilitated by the implementation by each side of measures designed to promote
mutual confidence;
(h) Urges all concerned to commit themselves to the confidence building measures set
out below:
 i. That, as a first step towards the withdrawal of nor-Cypriot forces envisaged in the
Set of Ideas, the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus undergo a
significant reduction and that a reduction of defence spending be effected in the
Republic of Cyprus.
 ii. That the military authorities on each side cooperate with the United Nations Peace-
Keeping Force in Cyprus in order to extend the unmanning agreement of 1989 to
all areas of the United Nations-controlled Buffer Zone where the two sides are in
close proximity to each other.
 iii. That, with a view to the implementation of resolution 550 (1984), the area at
present under the control of the United Nations peacekeeping Force-in Cyprus be
extended to include Varosha.Nathalie Tocci
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 iv. That each side take active measures to promote people-to-people contact between
the two communities by reducing restrictions to the movement of persons across
the Buffer Zone;
 v. That restrictions imposed on foreign visitors crossing the Buffer Zone be reduced:
 vi. That each side propose bi-communal projects, for possible financing by lending
and donor Governments as well as international institutions;
 vii. That both sides commit themselves to the holding of a Cyprus-wide census under
the auspices of the United Nations;
 viii. That both sides cooperate to enable the United Nations to undertake, in the
relevant locations, feasibility studies in connection with the resettlement and
rehabilitation of persons who would be affected by the territorial adjustments as
part o f the overall agreement, and in connection with the program of economic
development that would, as part of the overall agreement, benefit those persons
who would resettle in the area under Turkish Cypriot administration;
(i) Requests the Secretary-General to follow up on the implementation of the above
confidence-building measures and to keep the Security-Council informed as
appropriate.
(j) Also requests the Secretary-General to maintain such preparatory contacts as he
considers appropriate before the resumption of the joint meetings in March 1993,
and to propose for the Security Council’s consideration revisions in the negotiating
format to make it more effective.
(k) Further requests the Secretary-General, during the March 1993 joint-meetings, to
assess developments on a regular basis with the Council with a view to considering
what further action may be needed by the Council.
(l) Requests the Secretary-General to submit a full report after the conclusion of the
joint meetings that will resume in March 1993.
Adopted at its 3140




Agreement of the 12 February 1977 between Makarios and Denktas under the auspices
of UN Secretary-General, Dr Waldheim
(a) We are seeking an independent, non-aligned and bi-communal Federal Republic.
(b) The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the
light of the economic viability or productivity and land ownership.
(c) Questions of principles like freedoms of movement, freedom of settlement, the right
to property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into
consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain
practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.
(d) The powers and function of the central federal government will be such as to
safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the
state.
Agreement of the 19 May 1979 between Kyprianou and Denktas under the auspices of
UN Secretary-General, Dr Waldheim
(a) It was agreed to resume inter-communal talks on 15 June 1979.
(b) The basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktas guidelines of 12 February 1977
and the UN resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question.
(c) There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the
citizens of the Republic.
(d) The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.
(e) Priority will be given to reaching an agreement of the resettlement of Varosha under
UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the
interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive
settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached it will be implemented
without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus
problem.
(f) It will be agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardise the outcome of
the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both
sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.
(g) The demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged and matters relating
thereto will be discussed.
(h) The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the
Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any
other country and against any form of partition or secession.
(i) The inter-communal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner,
avoiding any delay.
(j) The inter-communal talks will take place in Nicosia.Nathalie Tocci
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540 160 160 160 160
€ GDP pc 12000 4000 Transfer in € pc 2000 500 1600
€ GDP m. 6480 640 Cost in m.€ 320 80 256
% of GDP of GC. 4.9 1.2 4.0
% of GDP of TC. 50 12.5 40
Source:Commission Regular Report on Cyprus 1999Nathalie Tocci
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